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Kazakhstan: 
the regional success story
Anna Wo∏owska
Theses
Kazakhstan can boast economic development li-
ke no other country in Central Asia. In contrast to
other countries of the region, which have rich na-
tural resources, Kazakhstan has managed to use
its economic potential in a way that yields con-
crete benefits now and, at the same time, creates
prospects for further sustainable economic
growth. 
Kazakhstan owes its position of the regional 
leader of change to its consistent reform policy
during the recent decade, the implementation of
which has been definitely facilitated by the sta-
ble internal and international situation of the
country and its political system, called “velvet
authoritarianism”. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan’s
success would not have been possible, if not for
its economic potential and the favourable condi-
tions on the world markets.
The political situation of the country, which is cri-
ticised by the international community, is quite
good in the regional context; owing to his strong
position, president Nazarbayev fully controls the
situation, his actions are predictable, which streng-
thens the sense of stability and security among
the citizens. Therefore, the limitation of democra-
tic liberties has hardly any meaning for a vast ma-
jority of Kazakhstan’s residents. 
Introduction 
Just several years ago, the position of Kazakhstan
as the regional leader was not so obvious. Since
the emergence of the independent republics in
Central Asia, there has been rivalry for leadership
between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which to 
a great extent has been an effect of the personal
leadership ambitions of the countries’ respective
presidents, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Ka-
rimov. While Uzbekistan prefers the model of lea-
dership based on political and military hegemony,
Kazakhstan chooses economic development. Ne-
vertheless, Kazakhstan has managed to outdo Uz-
bekistan in the military field, too1. Currently, it
has the largest and best equipped army in the re-
gion in terms of both absolute categories and its
operational potential. 
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The increasing income from exports of energy
raw materials, the growing GDP and the highest
among CIS countries level of foreign investments,
combined with the adopted economic develop-
ment strategy have helped Kazakhstan to achieve
the position of the indisputable leader of econo-
mic change in the entire region during the recent
five years. At the same time, it should be empha-
sised that the political situation of the country,
though far from the ideal, makes it stand out
among the other Central Asian states. 
Political reform cannot keep pace with the im-
pressive tempo of economic change. Unless the
dissonance between the economic and political
situations in Kazakhstan is levelled, in the longer
term, it may hinder further economic develop-
ment of the country.
I. The economic success of
Kazakhstan
The example of Kazakhstan shows that making
the effort of economic reform may start yielding
measurable benefits. The achievements of the re-
cent several years (the breakthrough date was
the year 2000, which confirmed that the Kazakh
economy was strong enough not to be affected
by the Russian crisis) prove it beyond doubt: it is
Kazakhstan which has shown the model and di-
rection of economic change to be followed by
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The latter two coun-
tries model their own bills concerning economic
issues on Kazakh legislation. 
1. Economic rates: the confirmation
of economic achievements
Kazakhstan's energy raw material resources and
its development strategy make that the country
has the highest level of foreign investments of all
CIS members, its gross national product is con-
stantly increasing and life standards are improving.
Kazakhstan managed to repay its loans to the In-
ternational Monetary Fund in 2000, seven years
before the due repayment date. As a result, the
Fund closed its office in Astana considering that
further aid would not be necessary. In early 2002,
the US Trade Department deemed Kazakhstan 
a market economy, and the US administration is
considering the option of withdrawal from eco-
nomic aid, believing that it is no longer needed. 
In 2001, the inflation in Kazakhstan dropped to
6.4%, and it has remained at this level until now2.
GDP has been constantly growing for five years
(last year, instead of the predicted 7.3%, it grew
by 9.2%)3, GDP per capita was at US$ 1,649 in 2002
(it was five times larger than the GDP of Kyrgyz-
stan or Uzbekistan)4. Foreign direct investments
are the greatest of all the other CIS countries (esti-
mates for the year 2002 indicate the sum of US$
564 per capita5), and, according to forecasts for
the nearest years, their level should increase by
6–7%, which guarantees further fast growth of
the GDP and of the state’s earnings.
2. The good investing climate
As compared to other countries in Central Asia,
the investing climate in Kazakhstan is exceptio-
nally good, which is confirmed by the level of fo-
reign investments in the country. 
The red tape (the need to obtain countless permits
and licences) and the omnipresent corruption de-
finitely make investing activity more difficult, still,
as the game is for high stakes, this does not scare
investors off.
Back in the 90’s, the Kazakh authorities were
aware of the fact that increasing the production
and exports of energy raw materials would not
be possible without attracting huge foreign in-
vestments to the country. Therefore, they were
trying to create the best possible conditions for
investing. The great contracts were not always
profitable for Kazakhstan from the commercial
point of view. However, owing to that, they mana-
ged to attract foreign capital. As investments were
flowing in and the mining sector was developing,
efforts to strengthen the position of Kazakh share-
holders were made. During the recent two years,
such efforts have clearly intensified. Inter alia, the
tax code and the law on natural resource stock
and users have been amended. Regulations are of-
ten ambiguous, which makes life for investors
more difficult. Quite recently, there has been pre-
pared a bill according to which in public bidding
preference will be given to domestic companies,
even if the prices offered by them are higher than
those offered by foreign companies (up to 20%).
A new obligation to hire Kazakh subcontractors
and specialists has also been imposed on in-
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vestors, and KazMunaiGaz (Kazakh state-owned
oil and gas enterprise) must hold 50% or even,
according to other sources, 51% of the shares in
every new investment project. There also appear
reports on attempts to renegotiate some of the
contracts signed by foreign entities6. The intensi-
fication of such actions is seen by foreign inves-
tors as worsening of the investing climate. 
In spite of such changes, the investing climate in
Kazakhstan remains unmatched in the region.
Although the investment level lowered in 2002
(by almost 11%), still everything seems to sug-
gest that that has just been a sign of temporary
discouragement, and forecasts for the nearest
years are optimistic. 
3. Kazakhstan, the target of regional
migrations
During the recent years, Kazakhstan’s migration
balance has clearly improved7. This can be seen
as one of the signs of the situation in the country
improving. 
A phenomenon on the regional scale is the re-
emigration to Kazakhstan of Russians who seve-
ral years earlier decided to return to Russia and of
Kazakhs who have so far lived outside of Kazakh-
stan. In 2000–2002, according to official statis-
tics, immigration from Uzbekistan doubled (from
12.8 thousand to 24.6 thousand)8. As economic
immigrants stay here illegally, presumably, in fact
the numbers are many times bigger. Kazakh-
stan’s economic success makes that this country
is perceived as an attractive target of economic
migration, both seasonal and, to an increasingly
greater degree, ultimate. This mainly concerns the
poorer southern neighbours of Kazakhstan: the
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks (Tajik economic emigrants still
mainly go to Russia). According to press reports,
every autumn, 200 thousand illegal immigrants
are looking for seasonal occupation in the Kazakh
southern oblast9. Kazakhstan is an attractive job
market for its neighbours and nothing seems to
indicate that the situation could change in the
nearest future. 
II. The key causes 
of the economic success
1. The country’s economic potential
The economic success of Kazakhstan would not
have been possible, if not for its economic poten-
tial. At the same time, the example of the neigh-
bouring countries, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
having rich deposits of gas, shows that just hav-
ing an economic potential is not sufficient for eco-
nomic development. 
The greatest wealth of Kazakhstan are its energy
raw material resources, the largest confirmed
and predicted oil deposits in the region. A vast
majority of Kazakh oil deposits can be found in the
Caspian Sea shelf. They are compared to the Uni-
ted States’ or the North Sea deposits, and some
specialists are convinced that the Kazakh resour-
ces are much greater. In 2003, Kazakhstan produ-
ced 51 million tons of oil and was the second lar-
gest (after Russia) producer among the countries
that emerged after the collapse of the USSR. Ka-
zakhstan is and will be the key exporter of this
raw material in the Caspian region. During the
recent 10 years, oil production in Kazakhstan has
grown more than twice, which has allowed for
increasing exports and, even though the volume
of Kazakh exports has not had a great impact on
the global oil market, still the situation may fun-
damentally change in the nearest decade. The
forecasts that there will be a boost in oil produc-
tion and export in the nearest years are based on
the levels of foreign investments in the produc-
tion sector and transport infrastructure, on the
degree of advancement of certain projects and,
above all, on the high prices of oil on global mar-
kets. 
Kazakhstan has also rich deposits of iron and 
other metals ore, the production and export of
which is the second largest, after income from
oil, source of its budget earnings. The country is
also one of the key regional crop producers. Still,
the other sectors of the economy do not really
have a great meaning; the tempo of the country’s
economic development is dependent on the oil
sector. As it is going to further grow in the nearest
years, the economic development forecasts for
this country are optimistic. However, the increa-
47
K
a
z
a
k
h
s
ta
n
: 
th
e
 r
e
g
io
n
a
l 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
 s
to
r
y
C E S  S t u d i e s
sing dependence of the entire economy on oil pro-
duction (and, to a smaller degree, on the metallur-
gy) is going to be the greatest challenge for the
authorities in their shaping of the economic poli-
cy and the greatest risk factor in the long-term
development forecasts.
2. The economic policy 
set by the authorities
2.1. The reforms
Kazakhstan, beyond any doubt, adheres to a good
human resources policy in the field of economy.
The consistent reform policy, launched in mid 90’s,
is implemented under the supervision of specia-
lists, who often either have Western education
or are foreign consultants. 
The authorities implemented the banking system
reform, owing to which Kazakh banks have be-
come the most reliable in the region10. Currently,
34 banks are operating in Kazakhstan. More than
a half of them are Kazakh banks. Bank services
are increasingly more popular. The National Bank
of Kazakhstan, using the expertise of the Norwe-
gian Central Bank, in 2001 created the National
Fund, as a part of which stabilisation means are
gathered and savings are made. Oil income sur-
pluses are transferred to the Fund when the oil
price is higher than US$ 19 per barrel. If oil pri-
ces drop below that level, then the savings depo-
sited in the Fund can be used to support the sta-
te budget. Currently, the Fund has approximate-
ly US$ 3.7 billion11. The means gathered as a part
of the Fund are invested on foreign markets. 
Using the support of the International Monetary
Fund, Kazakhstan has reformed its tax system.
Small and medium enterprises have been priva-
tised, and the process of privatisation of large oil
and gas companies, which foreign investors have
been given access to, has started. As a result, the
level of foreign direct investments, even though
lower than in 2001, has in recent two years been
above US$ 4 billion, of which US$ 3 billion have
been invested in the oil sector12. 
In June 2003, the land code came into effect. It
provides for privatisation of land, which is sup-
posed to stimulate growth of agricultural pro-
duction.
Reform of the pension system has been imple-
mented in cooperation with the World Bank: 
a transition from the solidarity-based system to
cumulative system is taking place, although it is
a difficult and lengthy process. Currently, 16 pen-
sion funds that are not owned by the state are
operating in Kazakhstan. Theoretically, employers
are obliged to transfer 10% of employee wages
to such funds. As there are no proper mechanisms
of control, this duty is often neglected. This
March, the Economic Policy Council decided to
privatise the National Pension Fund by the end
of this year. 
At the same time, the authorities are aware of the
dangerous dependence of the entire economy on
the oil sector and they take steps to protect the
country against any consequences of this dispro-
portion. The adopted development strategy Ka-
zakhstan 2030 and the development plan until
2015 assume development of other branches of
the economy, mainly of raw material processing.
For the time being, such programmes are only of
declarative nature; there are no concrete propo-
sals for change or proofs of implementation or
effectiveness forecasts. 
2.2. Authoritarianism friendly 
to liberalisation of the economy
In contrast to Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, where
the authoritarian authorities are aiming at stren-
gthening of the state monopoly in the key sectors
of the economy, Kazakhstan has chosen a com-
pletely different, liberal economic model, which,
paradoxically, the authoritarian system has faci-
litated. 
It was the president’s conscious decision to grant
priority to economic transformation, moving po-
litical reform away to some indefinite future.
Owing to the fact that they control the entire po-
litical system, the authorities have not met with
any significant resistance in their implementation
of unpopular reforms. The parliament does not
have any real power in Kazakhstan, so passing
government-dictated bills in both of its cham-
bers is not a difficult task. The laws approved by
the parliament are then signed by their original
author. This way the president not only receives
formal support for his decisions but also, owing
to applicable procedures, he has the chance of
withdrawing from especially controversial ini-
tiatives. He can do that by either vetoing a given
bill or forwarding it for consideration to the Con-
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stitutional Court. Although the Court is not an
independent authority in Kazakhstan and most
of the society believe that the decisions taken by
it are consulted with the president, still Nursultan
Nazarbayev, by custom, refers to its decisions,
which is then used to build his image of a demo-
crat, mostly to please the international opinion.
A good example of such actions was the way the
controversial land code was brought into effect
last year. The MPs proposed so many amend-
ments to the government’s bill that the then go-
vernment chief, Imangali Tasmagambetov, wan-
ting to push trough his own version of the code,
had to order vote of confidence to his own cabi-
net. The support that he received as a result of
the voting meant that the government’s bill was
automatically approved and to come into effect
it only needed to be signed by the president. The
public discontent caused by the prospect of final
approval of the bill that the prime minister and
the president had been pushing, the provisions
of which would have mainly affected people liv-
ing the countryside, i.e. at least 40% of the pop-
ulation, was the most probable cause of the dis-
missal of the prime minister and forwarding of
the land code by the president to be considered
by the Constitutional Court. This move made it
possible for Nursultan Nazarbayev to grant his
consent to some of the amendments proposed
by the parliament without losing face. 
The authoritarian authorities in Kazakhstan ha-
ve not only initiated economic changes, but they
also have become a guarantee for the country’s
stability. The fact that no serious tensions or riots
have taken place in Kazakhstan since the country
gained independence is a unique phenomenon in
the region (a peculiar situation in this regard
exists in Turkmenistan). The sense of stability and
security contributes to economic development.
Foreign investors opt for political stability, which
gives more guarantees for implementation of the
concluded contracts; this being another reason
for delaying the process of political change. This
way the authoritarian regime is, paradoxically,
conducive to liberalisation of the economy. 
III. Threats to economic 
development of Kazakhstan
The main potential threats to economic develop-
ment of Kazakhstan are embedded in the eco-
nomic system itself (the total dependence of the
Kazakh economy on the oil sector or the disso-
nance between the economic and political devel-
opment of the country), yet, for the time being,
they are not able to hamper it. 
1. Dependence of the economy 
on the oil industry
Almost total dependence of the Kazakh economy
on the oil sector is the main threat to further de-
velopment of Kazakhstan. So far, regardless of ef-
forts, the authorities have not managed to give
a boost to other branches of the economy, apart
from the one connected with the oil industry.
Pursuant to the objectives of the government-
-proposed development programme, the volume
of oil production will double in the nearest six
years. This will, in all probability, mean further
growth of the dominating role of the oil indus-
try, a tendency observed for at least six years in
Kazakhstan: the share of the oil sector in GDP
grew from 7% in 1998 to 17% in 2002; 71% of all
the investments go to the oil and gas sector, and
export of oil and gas constitutes more than 50%
of the entire export13. As a result, even though
Kazakhstan’s economy is now less exposed to
the risk of being affected by rapidly worsening
conditions on the global markets than it was
several years ago, still a drop in the prices of oil
(below US$ 15 per barrel) and gas or unexpected
export impediments may shake the standing of
the country. The growing incomes of the oil sec-
tor, regardless of efforts, do not translate into
development of other branches of the Kazakh
economy. 
Kazakh oil deposits are still far away from inter-
national markets and the production and trans-
port infrastructure, almost all of which is inher-
itance from the Soviet times, is insufficient and
outdated. Currently, Kazakhstan can use the net-
work of Russian pipelines, which causes that Rus-
sia holds the monopoly over the transit infra-
structure and transport of oil from Kazakhstan.
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Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan,
has many a time supported diversification of oil
transit routes, however, according to estimates,
other transport routes will provide Kazakhstan
an alternative to the transit through Russia as
late as in 6 to 10 years. 
2. The dissonance between the 
economic and political development
The political situation in Kazakhstan, which once
used to be considered the leader of democratic
change in Central Asia, has substantially worse-
ned, while the economy of the country has ra-
pidly developed. 
While the liberalisation of the Kazakh economy
has been making progress, the political system
of this country has remained stagnant. Now, this
is a moment when the growing dissonance bet-
ween the economic and political development
seems not to endure long. The authoritarian re-
gime has facilitated implementation of unpopu-
lar reforms, thus enabling the country to develop
economically. Now, further development seems
impossible without carrying out political reforms.
The rapid economic growth has made possible
the “satiation of the elites” and, consequently,
formation of a new social group: people who are
relatively young, well-educated and rich, who,
owing to foreign contacts and their own obser-
vations while travelling, are able to objectively
evaluate the situation in the country. They can
make long-term plans and are aware of the fact
that, even for those who are not going to be-
come involved in political activity, limitations of
political liberties are definitely burdensome. The
non-transparent structures of the authorities, the
existence of informal groups of influence, the
common red tape and corruption, the limited ac-
cess to information; all this causes that the feel-
ing of the need for change is becoming increas-
ingly more common. The president is also aware
of the fact that political reforms are inevitable,
which, however, does not mean that he is ready
to start them. 
3. Corruption
Corruption in Kazakhstan is embedded in the sys-
tem, which is a very burdensome element of eve-
ryday life. 
This does not only concern civil servants but also
representatives of the tax police, customs ser-
vices and the judiciary system. Therefore most
of residents of Kazakhstan try to avoid any con-
tacts with representatives of the civil services
and to resolve conflicts, as far as possible, out of
court. Corruption has during the recent years be-
come a serious threat to the education system: it
is commonly known that one can buy a diploma
of graduation of any higher education institution
at a bazaar. Great possibilities for abuse stem from
the very economic model of Kazakhstan, with the
dominating role of the oil sector, access to which
is limited by masses of red tape regulations. Re-
presentatives of the authorities who control the
usage of oil resources may succumb to tempta-
tion of growing rich in an easy way by abusing
their powers in making decisions concerning par-
ticular investors14. The existence of a vast grey
area, beyond any doubt, also stimulates corrup-
tion. According to the estimates of some inter-
national experts, this phenomenon reaches the
level of 22–34% GDP15.
In 1998, Kazakhstan passed an anti-corruption
law and in 2002 it joined the Anti-Corruption Plan
supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). However, such moves
were purely declarative, and the disclosure in
1999 of the corruption scandal, the main prota-
gonists of which were the most senior state offi-
cials, only strengthened the common belief that
everyone took bribes. The so-called Kazakhgate
(the most widely publicised corruption scandal in
Kazakhstan) has not been cleared out for five years
now: in 1999, western mass media disclosed that
president Nazarbayev had secret accounts in
Swiss banks, which was discovered during the
investigation into the matter of James Giffen,
who was suspected of handing over bribes to Ka-
zakh officials from western oil companies. Giffen
was an advisor to president Nazarbayev and he
also acted as an agent in the purchase of a half
of the shares in Tengiz deposit by Chevron.
Kazakh authorities were denying the existence
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of the bank accounts for free subsequent years.
Finally, in 2002, their existence was unexpectedly
confirmed by the then prime minister Imangali
Tasmagabetov, who at the same time assured that
they were used for state, and not private, purpo-
ses. The sentence in Giffen’s case is due to be pas-
sed in the nearest months, and then it will appear
whether the allegations brought against presi-
dent Nazarbayev have been well-grounded. 
IV. The political situation 
in the country
1. Cooperation with Russia 
and the West
Kazakhstan’s standing in the international arena
is relatively strong and stable; its political situa-
tion makes it stand out above the other Central
Asian countries. The state has since the beginning
been pursuing a very careful policy of balancing
the influence of Russia, the USA and China, at
the same time rivalling with Uzbekistan for lea-
dership in the region. Traditionally, the Russian
line in the foreign policy is a matter of priority
for the Kazakh diplomacy. 
Kazakhstan is the only state in Central Asia to
border the Russian Federation. It also has the
most numerous Russian minority among the CIS.
Vast majority of Kazakh oil is transported
through the territory of the Russian Federation.
Moreover, the two countries have preserved very
strong economic ties, dating back to the USSR
times. The relations between Astana and Mos-
cow can be defined as correct. 
Along with participation of both countries in re-
gional economic initiatives, political and military
ties are also important. Kazakhstan is an active
member of regional organisations of military co-
operation and a loyal to Russia participant in the
Collective Security Treaty Organisation. This is to
a great extent a result of pure calculation: mili-
tary cooperation with Russia gives guarantee of
cheap repairs of the equipment, training and wea-
pons supplies at prices applicable inside Russia.
Kazakhstan is the only country in the region to
have measurable benefits from the Russian mili-
tary presence in its territory. Moscow pays US$
115 million annually for the lease of the largest
Russian military base located outside the RF, the
Baikonur Cosmodrome. 
Regardless of its close cooperation with Russia,
Kazakhstan is still able to tighten its military co-
operation with the West, above all with the USA,
even when this is contrary to Russian interests.
The reform of the Kazakh army was to some ex-
tent modelled on US solutions: US experience was
used during the creation of the Kazakh military
doctrine and during the creation of the program-
me of structural changes in the army. The Kazakh
peacekeeping battalion, KAZAKBAT, was formed
on the basis of NATO standards, with US assis-
tance. Regardless of Moscow’s protests, Astana
decided to create the fleet on the Caspian Sea with
the aid of Americans. 
Cooperation with the USA, on both political and
military level, tightened after 11th September 2001.
Kazakhstan was the only Central Asian state to
send its soldiers to Iraq. Even though their pre-
sence there is of minor importance in military
terms (a little more than twenty people have
been sent), still it has a symbolic meaning: the
more pro-US Uzbekistan has not sent its soldiers
to Iraq. 
Still, no significant changes have taken place in
economic issues, which are among the priorities of
the Kazakh foreign policy. Washington is greatly
interested in Kazakhstan’s joining the project for
transit through the South Caucasus, which it has
been lobbying for (Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline).
This would help lessen the dependence on the
Persian Gulf oil and, at the same time, this would
provide Kazakh oil a wider access to global mar-
kets and break up the Russian monopoly on tran-
sit of Kazakh oil. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan, taking
into account the position of Russia in the region
and searching for the most profitable solutions,
is stalling for time. It declares its support to the
BTC project, yet it does not engage in the imple-
mentation thereof. Recently, it has also been tigh-
tening its cooperation with its second powerful
neighbour, China. The construction of the pipe-
line going to China is due to be completed by
2010, and its capacity will subsequently be in-
creased. 
Simultaneously, the incessant pressure exerted
by the West (by both European countries and the
USA) on Kazakhstan to stop breaking the rules of
democracy provoke a reaction that is contrary to
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the expected one: this contributes to the estab-
lishing of closer relations between Astana and
Moscow, which does not make any reservations
as to the way of ruling by Nursultan Nazarbayev.
One of the recent glaring examples of the opera-
tion of this mechanism was the signing, together
with seven other CIS countries, of the Moscow-
-initiated statement criticising the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe for its care
for respecting human rights and democratic stan-
dards in the region at the expense of the economic
and security issues. The signatories to the docu-
ment claimed that the activity of the organisa-
tion was politicised and did not take into con-
sideration the special conditions in the countries,
and that the organisation unfairly criticised their
authorities. 
2. The regional cooperation
The regional cooperation in Central Asia is limit-
ed to the formal sphere: making declarations
and signing agreements. In fact, there is lacking
will for action and mutual trust among the near-
est neighbours, which is necessary for develop-
ment of any cooperation. Only bilateral policy gi-
ves certain effects. 
Kazakhstan has since the mid 90’s taken initiati-
ves aiming at regional cooperation in a narrower
than CIS, thus more effective, company. How-
ever, Astana’s efforts in this regard have not given
the expected results. The inefficacy of the pro-
integration actions seems quite easy to explain:
it is impossible to cause economic integration of
countries that have fundamentally different eco-
nomic systems. Political elites of particular coun-
tries, caring for their interests more than for the
interests of their states, are the less so capable of
thinking in terms of regional interests. An exam-
ple that perfectly illustrates the problem is the
question of water in Central Asia. Subsequent
crises, which pose the threat of flooding parts of
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the winter and of
deficiency of water necessary to irrigate the fields
in both of the countries during the summer, not
only prove inefficiency of the current solutions
on the issue of water resources’ management
but also show the lack of will for a real coopera-
tion (even in emergency cases) and total mutual
distrust among the closest neighbours. 
A tremendous role in Central Asia is played by per-
sonal relations between presidents, which in most
cases are not really good and which directly trans-
late into relations between the countries. In the
states, which gained independence a little than
a decade ago, integration is perceived as a pro-
cess limiting sovereignty, which may be another
reason why declarations of will to integrate are
just declarations. 
Bilateral agreements are definitely more effective
than multilateral cooperation. Owing to such so-
lutions, Kazakh authorities have managed so far
to prevent potential border-related conflicts from
escalating. Even though the process of border
demarcation has not been finished, and tensions
concerning this issue regularly reoccur, still they
have never turned into a serious conflict. Inci-
dents are most numerous on the border between
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbek border guards
regularly shoot at citizens of Kazakhstan in cases
of border line violation or failure to meet formal
regulations, which often results in casualties.
There is serious concern that, against the hopes
placed on the completion of the process of deli-
mitation, it can only decrease the tension in the
frontier region and not really eliminate such inci-
dents. Border cooperation with the other neigh-
bours is much better. 
3. The position of the president
President Nazarbayev, who is the main actor on
the political scene of Kazakhstan, has total con-
trol of the situation in the country. Maintaining
the status quo seems realistic not only for the
nearest two years (i.e. until the presidential elec-
tions) but also in the longer term.
Personification of power is a common phenome-
non in Kazakhstan: any successes are perceived
as personal merits of the president. Nursultan
Nazarbayev is believed to be the author of the Ka-
zakh way of reform. The line taken by him gives
effects, which causes that, despite his troubles
connected among other things with the corrup-
tion scandal, the president enjoys great public
trust. In addition, the awareness of the way the
situation has developed in the neighbouring
countries helps citizens of Kazakhstan acknow-
ledge the relative stability and security in their
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country. The corruption scandal has hardly affec-
ted the standing of president Nazarbayev in the
country. It is a common belief that corruption in
Kazakhstan is embedded in the system and that
everyone takes bribes. In the public opinion, Gif-
fen’s case is not exceptional, as the public is con-
vinced that corruption is common. Nevertheless,
Kazakhgate may affect the president’s position
in an indirect way: the president’s troubles, inclu-
ding his inability to travel abroad, may seriously
weaken his standing at home and, as a result,
force him to resign. Meanwhile, the president,
who is, in all probability, considering the scena-
rios of handing over power to a proper candi-
date16, has declared that he is going to take part
in the presidential election scheduled for 2006
and he is actively participating in the prepara-
tions of his supporters for this year’s parliamen-
tary elections. 
The result of the elections (both the nearest par-
liamentary and the subsequent presidential elec-
tions) seems to be a foregone conclusion. The pro-
presidential parties Otan and Asar (the party of
the president’s daughter, Darigha Nazarbayeva)
are bound to be the front-runners; and Nursultan
Nazarbayev has no serious rival in the race to
presidency. If the power were to be handed over
(which is not likely in the nearest time), then the
successor of president Nazarbayev would have
to be supported by him and continue his policy.
The democrats’ dreams of a revolution in Kazakh-
stan seem unrealistic. 
4. The Kazakh political scene
The political life of Kazakhstan is successfully go-
verned by the president and his closest milieu.
The multi-party system is just a facade: it puts
on a show of existence of a platform for political
discussion in the country, while in fact the party
system is controlled by the authorities. 
President Nazarbayev does not have to be anx-
ious about the consequences of the existence of
the multi-party system. Following the sharpen-
ing of the policy in 2002, the opposition has been
admitted to registration this year, which however
does not mean that it has any chance of becom-
ing a real player on the political scene. 
At the beginning of the last year, as a result of
bringing into force of the new restrictive law on
political parties, which provided for the need of
re-registration of all the parties, more than a half
of them disappeared from the political scene of
Kazakhstan (of the 19 existing in 2002, only 7 we-
re granted re-registration in early 2003, and there-
after two other joined in). During the recent two
months, the number of registered parties has
grown from 9 to 12. 
On 4th May, the opposition Democratic Choice of
Kazakhstan was registered, and the Democratic
Party of Kazakhstan and the Communist People’s
Party of Kazakhstan were respectively registered
on 17th June and 21st June. Astana can afford this
kind of pluralism without any serious anxiety,
knowing that the unquestionable front-runners
of the autumn election are going to be Asar, the
party of the president’s daughter, Darigha Nazar-
bayeva, and Otan, president Nazarbayev’s party,
and the quite good ratings of Ak Zhol party,
which is perceived as soft opposition, may only
improve the image of Kazakhstan in the eyes of
the West. Victory of the pro-presidential parties
will, however, mean not only support to the rul-
ing team but also confirmation of success of the
methods used by it to control the political life in
the country (including the election campaign
owing to the fact that the president’s daughter
controls 80% of the mass media and of the elec-
toral process itself owing to the introduction of
the electronic system of voting).
Interesting is the phenomenon of Asar party,
which has managed to win double figures sup-
port in just several months of its existence17. The
programme of Asar does not really differ from the
presidential programme Kazakhstan 2030 or pro-
grammes of other parties; the party is for stren-
gthening the role of the president, development
of civil institutions, fight against corruption and
the need to develop other, in addition to the oil
sector, branches of the economy. However, the
key asset of the party is not its programme but its
chairperson; Darigha Nazarbayeva, who, success-
fully using her position of the president’s daugh-
ter, has mobilised local authorities to satisfy the
needs of Asar party. Following the party founding
congress, its local offices have been opened in all
the regions in just several-days’ time.
Speculations about the political ambitions of Da-
righa Nazarbayeva have been the most discussed
topic for more than a half year in Kazakhstan.
Commentators are unanimous in their opinion
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that the party, the leader of which is the chief of
the most influential media group, who is at the
same time the president’s daughter, need not be
too anxious about the election result. In turn, vic-
tory in the elections may facilitate further politi-
cal career for Darigha Nazarbayeva. There appear
speculations that Nazarbayeva may be entrusted
with the function of the Speaker of the Senate,
which would mean that she would become the
second most important person in the state and,
in the case of the president’s illness or other
emergency, she could replace him. Nazarbayeva
claims she is not going to stand for the nearest
presidential election, adding that the best and
most certain candidate is the current president. 
The opposition in Kazakhstan is weak and inter-
nally divided. The return to the political scene of
the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan does not
mean that its influence has recently grown. At the
same time, it is difficult to judge on the political
sentiments of the entire society. Political life of
the country is limited to the elites concentrated
in Almaty and Astana and in several other larger
cities. A vast majority of citizens18 have an ambi-
valent attitude to politics. Even those who are the
worst off19 do not voice loud slogans for radical
change.
5. The civil liberties
The freedom of speech or of meeting guaranteed
under the law is successfully limited with the usa-
ge of the same law in Kazakhstan. Therefore, it is
hard to accuse Kazakh authorities of violating le-
gal regulations. 
Under the Kazakh law, information on the presi-
dent and his family, including on their property
and the way their money is invested or on their
health, is considered state secret, the disclosure of
which is punished by various sanctions. The civil
code includes regulations under which publishing
slanderous, i.e. untrue (or impossible to prove), in-
formation about the president, MPs or senior sta-
te officials can be punished by ban on publication
or even closing of the editor’s office. Investiga-
tive journalism has become a very risky occupa-
tion in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, courts do not
abuse the powers they have under the regula-
tions: from among 21 journalists sentenced in
2003, only one was sentenced for slander. Most
of the actions concern cases that are formally not
connected with the journalist activity of the de-
fendants and the charges are often fabricated for
the needs of an investigation, as e.g. it was in the
widely publicised case of the investigative jour-
nalist Sergey Duvanov, who following the publi-
cation of materials on the scandal of corruption
among the Kazakh ruling elites was sentenced to
3.5 years of imprisonment for allegedly raping 
a minor20.
While the constitution of Kazakhstan provides for
the freedom of meeting, the detailed regulations
openly limit this freedom. Taking part in meet-
ings that are not approved by the authorities is
considered an administrative offence and is sub-
ject to punishment. Individuals convicted for such
an offence have no right to take official posts or be
candidates in elections. 
Due to such legal solutions Kazakh authorities
can successfully impede the activity of their poli-
tical opponents and, at the same time, by bring-
ing charges under the administrative or criminal
code, they can avoid allegations of launching po-
litical trials. 
V. Summary
As market analysts have forecasted, there is going
to be fast economic development in the nearest
years in Kazakhstan. At the same time, the Kazakh
authorities are facing the need to lessen the de-
pendence of the economy on the oil sector by
developing other branches of industry. 
The awareness of the need to move away from
the previous economic model is common among
the ruling elites. However, the easy way of gen-
erating profits for the state owing to exploita-
tion of deposits of natural resources does not
contribute to stimulation of actions to diversify
the economy. 
There is nothing to suggest that any radical po-
litical changes will happen in Kazakhstan in the
nearest time. It, however, cannot be excluded that
following the presidential election, the current
policy can be slightly amended. If there were to
be a change at the highest post in the state (there
certainly exist several scenarios for handover of
power), then activation of the political life in the
country could be expected. 
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The previous policy of balancing the influence of
the USA, Russia and China can be carried on with
success. The result of the rivalry between Kazakh-
stan and Uzbekistan for leadership in the region
already seems to be a foregone conclusion, and
the standing of Astana on the international arena
is stable. 
In Kazakhstan itself, achievements of the autho-
rities are valued high: the public, aware of the de-
velopment of the situation in the neighbouring
countries, appreciates the relative stability and
the feeling of security being a consequence of it.
Even though the growth of average wages is
just a result of the growing incomes of people
employed in the oil, financial and services sec-
tors, while the wages in the sectors which pro-
vide employment to most of the population, i.e.
agriculture, health care and education sectors,
remain very low, still people have the sense of
prosperity and do not feel the need for any radi-
cal changes.  
Anna Wo∏owska
Work on the text was completed in August 2004
1 According to The Military Balance 2003–2004, Kazakhstan
in 2002 spent 2% GDP, i.e. US$ 1,986 million on defence;
65.8 thousand military personnel were on active duty.
Although in the same year, Uzbekistan’s defence spending
was at 2.9% GDP, still, nominally, it was only US$ 1,797 mil-
lion, and only 50–55 thousand military personnel were on
active duty. 
2 IMF (Country Report July 2003) and the National Bank of
Kazakhstan. 
3 Data according to: Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst, Janu-
ary 14, 2004.
4 www.eiu.com
5 Ibid.
6 The most publicised example of such actions was the case
of Chevron Texaco. Unofficially, the reason why its invest-
ments were suspended at Tengiz (one of the two largest
Kazakh deposits) in November 2002 was the pressure by
the Kazakh side to renegotiate the conditions of the agree-
ments concluded in 1993; following three-month negotia-
tions, the investments were resumed; similar situations
also happened to other companies. 
7 In 2000 – 2002, the number if emigrants dropped from
155,749 down to 120,150, and the number of immigrants
grew from 47,442 up to 58,162; data according to Statistical
Yearbook of Kazakhstan 2003.
8 Ibid.
9 Immigrants work on construction sites, tobacco and cot-
ton plantations receiving wages which Kazakhs would not
agree to work for. Their living conditions are often dramatic.
According the Kazakh newspaper Ekspres – K, the southern
oblast authorities last autumn were deporting more than
100 Uzbek illegal economic immigrants every week. The
same newspaper estimates that half of the cotton produced
in the south of Kazakhstan is harvested by illegal workers. 
10 In the 0 to 4 EBRD scale, in 2003, Kazakhstan was given
3 points, while Kyrgyzstan received 2.3 points; Russia 2.0
points; Uzbekistan 1.7 points; and Tajikistan 1.0 point. 
11 EBRD Transition Report 2003.
12 IMF Country Report No 03/211, July 2003 and EBRD
Transition Report 2003.
13 Data according to: Statistical Yearbook of Kazakhstan 2003,
and Meruert Makhmutova, “Extractive Industries Revenue
and National Found: Kazakhstan’s Experience”, ASN confe-
rence materials, Warsaw July 2004.
14 According to Transparency International data for 2002,
Kazakhstan stands at the 88th place on the list of 102 coun-
tries taken into account by the organisation; www.trans-
parency.org
15 Ekspress-K, Almaty, 21.02.2004.
16 Preparations for a possible handover of power are noth-
ing new in Kazakhstan: already in 2000, the president took
due care for the parliament to adopt the law “On the first
president of Kazakhstan”, which provides that after his res-
ignation, Nursultan Nazarbayev will receive not only life-
long financial protection and guarantees of personal secu-
rity but also numerous powers in ruling the country.
17 Results of the opinion poll carried out upon the order by
IIMP analytical centre, founded by Darigha Nazarbayeva,
show 70% support to her party; the results are, in all prob-
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ability, overstated, still even opponents of Asar party admit
that it has large support of the public. 
18 Some analysts claim that the number may even exceed
90%, in: Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst, March 10, 2004.
19 1/4 of Kazakhstan’s population live below the poverty
line, see www.adb.org 
20 As a result of international pressure (exerted by the
Department of State, the European Union and OSCE) in
January 2004, Duvanov, who had been consistently claim-
ing he was innocent and that the charges brought against
him had been fabricated, was released from prison after
spending a year in jail and he is going to serve the rest of
the sentence under house arrest. 
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